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by Hugo B. Margdin*
N RECENT YEARS, bilateral relations between Mexico and the
United States have undergone, as is to be expected, both positive mo-
ments and moments of friction. These positive moments have enhanced
the principles of mutual respect, the basis for international law. Moments
of friction have stemmed from either a lack of proper communication or
differing attitudes of two peoples with diverse cultural origins.
As an example of the reaction of some U.S. politicians, businessmen,
writers, and other citizens, I will discuss an article written by a distin-
guished scholar, published in the American press when the U.S. Govern-
ment was obviously displeased with Mexico's refusal to receive the Shah
of Iran after his medical treatment in New York. Another example I will
discuss is the speech delivered on the Senate floor on December 17, 1979
by Senator Lloyd Bentsen of Texas.
I consider it relevant to underscore Mexico's view towards some of
the problems, identified in the article and speech mentioned above, which
caused a temporary cooling of bilateral relations.
I.
On the 11th of January, 1980, Professor Sidney Weintraub published
an article in the Washington Post entitled "Mexican Standoffishness."'
The article begins by asserting that "relations between the two countries
had deteriorated, and President Carter set out to rectify this. He has
failed."'2 I will attempt to prove that if such a situation had occurred, it
certainly was not Mexico's fault, as implied by Professor Weintraub.
To state his case, Professor Weintraub refers to the toast with which
the President of Mexico greeted President Carter during the latter's visit
to Mexico in February 1979. On that occasion the Mexican President
said, among other things:
It is difficult, particularly among neighbors, to maintain cordial and mu-
*Mexican Ambassador to the United States.
Weintraub, Mexican Standoffishness, Wash. Post, Jan. 11, 1980, § A, at 15, col. 1.
2 Id.
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tually advantageous relations in an atmosphere of mistrust or open hos-
tility ....
[A]mong permanent, not casual, neighbors, surprise moves and sudden
deceit or abuse are poisonous fruits that sooner or later have a reverse
effect ....
[O]ur peoples want definitive agreements, not circumstantial concessions
[L]et us seek only lasting solutions-good faith and fair play- nothing
that would make us lose the respect of our children. .. .
Let me point out that the toast was an honorable and succinct ex-
pression of our way of thinking. We do not believe in friendship based on
silence, but rather in the free expression of our ideas according to the
prevailing circumstances of the moment. In reference to the circum-
stances which inspired President L6pez Portillo's toast, I give three ex-
amples of events which took place only a few days before President
Carter's visit to Mexico.
First, at the beginning of 1979, President L6pez Portillo travelled to
northern Mexico, near the border with the United States. A group of
American journalists, who asked to interview the President concerning bi-
lateral issues, arranged for a meeting, in Tijuana. Punctual as always, he
arrived at the previously agreed place. Instead of a group of journalists,
however, he found an embarrassed young lady who apologized for the de-
lay of the American journalists. She said that the journalists were about
to conclude an important interview with a distinguished personality from
the United States and that they would arrive in a few minutes. The Presi-
dent of Mexico waited over 30 minutes and was about to leave when the
American newspaper men and women arrived, offering a thousand ex-
cuses. In all frankness, the President told them not to worry. He said that
in Mexico everybody knows the degree of importance the United States
assigns to our country. When it concerns Mexican problems, he said,
there is always some other more important matter which has priority.4
Some journalists found that the straightforward remarks were rather
unfair to the United States. In fact, what the President of Mexico said
was within the bounds of politeness, considering the lack of courtesy dis-
played by the journalists who had requested the interview. If we live
under democratic systems, we must submit ourselves to the truth: it is
indispensable to express it without fear, to speak out.
Second, at that time, the plans for the erection of what has been re-
N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1979, § A, at 5, col. 1.
4 The idea is not a new one. The famous phrase of Daniel Moynihan, who once recom-
mended a policy of "benign neglect" for the racial problems in the United States, has been
extended to describe the chaotic state of "American policy towards Latin America." See D.
MOYNIHAN & S. WEAvER, A DANGEROUS PLACE 64-66 (1978).
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ferred to in the United States as the "Tortilla Curtain" had been initi-
ated. Special fences had been originally designed to cut off the hands or
feet of the undocumented aliens who dared climb over them.5 The pro-
tests, including those of the American public, were so strong that the pro-
ject for the fence-likened to the Berlin Wall-was promptly modified.e
Finally, another disturbing occurrence was the CBS-TV interview by
Dan Rather, with President L6pez Portillo two days before President
Carter's visit. Mr. Rather went to Mexico highly recommended by Ameri-
can personalities. I quote a statement made by Mr. Rather in reference to
the price of natural gas (my translation from the Spanish): "I understand
that Mr. Schlesinger (former Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger)
thinks that the price was highway robbery."'7 To which the President re-
sponded, "That is Mr. Schlesinger's opinion. We were working out a deal
(with the American companies) and the operation did not go through. It
was not highway robbery. Who would dare attack Mr. Schlesinger? Not I.
He would not permit it. I do not consider the price high: I think it was
reasonably formulated."8
President L6pez Portillo explained that instead of exporting the gas,
it would be used in Mexico. Mr. Rather then continued, "I understand,
Mr. President, that Mr. Schlesinger and possibly President Carter him-
self ... think that you are bluffing."' The President answered serenely,
"I am a sincere man who would deceive neither my people nor my neigh-
bors. I am a reasonable man who has no motive to bluff. I can substanti-
ate and- sustain each and every one of my observations. If in the United
States that was assumed, all I can say is, as in the classical comedies of
antiquity: 'Now I understand everything.' ,lo
' See TimE, Nov. 13, 1978, at 61, col. 1; Sinclair, U.S. and Mexico Embroiled in Dispute
Over 'Tortilla Curtain', Wash. Post, Dec. 24, 1978, § A, at 3, col. 1; Wash. Post, Oct. 25,
1978, § A, at 24, col. 2; Wash. Post, Oct. 31, 1978, § A at 18, col. 1.
' See Crewsdon, Plans for 'Berlin Wall' at El Paso Assailed, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1978,
§ A, at 22, col. 4; Sinclair, supra note 5, at 3, col. 1; Schutze, 6-Y2 Mile-Long 'Tortilla
Curtain' Planned To Stem Tide of Illegal Mexican Aliens, Wash. Post, Oct. 24, 1978, § A,
at 6, col. 4; Wash. Post, Mar. 17, 1979, § A, at 23, col. 5. But see Letter to the Editor, In
Defense of an El Paso 'Wall', N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1978, § A, at 22, col. 4. See also 80 DEP'T
STATE BuLL. 76 (Sept. 1980).
"Tengo entendido que el sefior Schlesinger piensa que el precio era un precio de
asaltante." Quoted in Secretaria de Programacion y Presupuseto, Direcci6n General de
Documentaci6n y Anilisis, En Torno a la Visita del Presidente Carter a Mexico, 17
CUADERNOS DE FiLsoFIA POLTICA DE Jost LPZ PoRT Lo 38 (1979)[copy on file at Case
Western Reserve Journal of International Law].
8 "Esa es la opini6n del senor Schlesinger. Esthbamos tratando y no se hizo Ia opera-
ci6n. No lo asaltamos. ?Quien se atreve a asaltar al seflor Schlesinger? Yo no. El no se deja.
A mi no me parece un precio alto: me parece un precio razonablemente compuesto." Id.
' "Tengo entendido, sefior Presidente, que el sefior Schlesinger, y posiblemente el Pre-
sidente Carter mismo, creen... que usted estit 'blofeando'." Id. at 39.
10 "Soy un hombre substancialmente sincero, que no engafiaria ni a mi pueblo ni a mis
1980
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II.
The background of the natural gas incident should be explained. In
the course of the natural gas dealings in 1977, six American companies,
headed by TENNECO, Inc., went to Mexico to arrange the purchase of
natural gas from PEMEX. They signed a "Memorandum of Intenfions"
to acquire two billion cubic feet of gas per day, at a price of $2.60 dollars
per mcf. The price of the natural gas was to be calculated by taking the
price of an alternative energy source, in this case number two fuel oil in
New York, as a basis and applying it to the equivalent number of BTU
per thousand cubic feet of natural gas.12
Mr. Schlesinger did not approve the price negotiated between
PEMEX and the six American companies. Senator Adlai E. Stevenson
also disapproved of the financial agreement. 13 Senator Stevenson opposed
the financial support that the Export-Import Bank was to provide to
build the necessary pipeline from Chiapas, in the south of Mexico, to our
common boundary at Reynosa-McAllen. Mexico would have invested the
six hundred million dollar loan in U.S. equipment and pipes.
1 4
This was the first time since the Mexican expropriation of the foreign
oil companies in 1938 that the United States applied a financial boycott
to Mexico. In this case, however, the City of London immediately offered
the same financial support on the same good terms. The syndicated bank-
ers oversubscribed the loan and Mexico was loaned one billion dollars.15
vecinos. Soy un hombre razonable que no tiene por qu6 'blofear'. Cada una de mis afirma-
ciones las puedo fundar y sostener. Si eso se supuso en Estados Unidos, pudiera yo decir
como en las comedias antiguas: ahora me lo explico todo." Id.
1 Memorandum of Intentions Between Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), Tenneco Inter
America, Inc., Texas Eastern Transmission Corp., El Paso Natural Gas Company, Southern
Natural Gas Company, Florida Gas Transmission Company, and Transcontinental Gas
Pipeline Corp., Aug. 3, 1977, at 2 [hereinafter cited as Memorandum of Intentions] [copy on
file at Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law].
" Id. at 2-3:
The price, F.o.b. Reynosa, shall be in U.S.A. dollars and calculated to equal the
total heating value price of No. 2 fuel oil in New York harbor, using the calcula-
tions the average of the high prices prevailing during the preceding quarter and
using 140,000 Btu/gal. as the heating value of the No. 2 fuel oil; if by the end of
any quarter the price index no longer reflects accurately the real commercial value
of energy delivered, a new price index shall be chosen by mutual agreement.
13 S. Con. Res. 59, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 34424-25 (1977).
11 Id. at 34425.
15 On November 8, 1977, Mexico obtained an import loan from an international consor-
tium of 113 banks. The loan, signed in Frankfurt, West Germany, amounted to 1.2 billion
dollars over a period of seven years with a three-year grace period and an interest rate of 1
and 3/4 % on the interbank rate of London (LIBOR). At the signing ceremony, the consor-
tium representatives (Bank of America, Lloyds Bank International, Compagnie Financiere
of Deutsche Bank and Morgan Guaranty Trust Company) repeatedly underscored the
"profound confidence they had in Mexico's future and its immediate development." See
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In this context, President L6pez Portillo's words to Mr. Rather are
easily understood.
This dispute about the natural gas was settled in September 1979
through government channels, but a lower price was set than the one es-
tablished in the aforementioned Memorandum of Intentions. 16 Thus, it
would appear that Professor Weintraub's contention regarding the
purchase of natural gas from Mexico is not accurate. He states that "the
primary U.S. motivation in signing the (1979) agreement was to mollify
the Mexicans. '17 We were given nothing that could be considered benefi-
cial to "mollify the Mexicans."
Despite the events mentioned above, President Carter's February
1979 visit to Mexico was a success. An appropriately friendly and frank
atmosphere prevailed, and I was present to witness it. The incident about
the "Montezuma's revenge" remark, as Professor Weintraub says, "was
not calculated rudeness" on the part of President Carter,18 and I could
not agree more. The remark was given no importance at all in Mexico,
where it was considered totally irrevelant within the substance and im-
portance of the visit. In contrast, in the words of Professor Weintraub,
"the U.S. press played up Carter's maladroit reference .... "
The conversations between the two Presidents were frank, to the
point, and always carried out in a friendly atmosphere. This cordiality is
reflected in the last paragraph of the joint communiqu6 which reads:
"President Carter suggested that both dignitaries meet again during the
summer of this year (1979) .... President L6pez Portillo accepted this
proposal with pleasure."20 Two presidential visits within a few months are
not a common occurrence.
Importante Pr~stamo Internacional, 37 EL MERCADO DE VALOREs 724, 728 (1977); Cr~dito
de 1200 Milliones de Dblares a Mexico, 37 EL MERCADO DE VALoREs 884 (1977).
In March, 1978, again due to the international respect it enjoys, Mexico obtained an-
other loan, which was exclusively assigned to the PEMEX Investment Program. Due to the
fact that the participating banks oversubscribed the amount, the credit reached one billion
dollars over a ten-year period, including a four-year grace period at an interest rate of 1 and
'A %. The five banks which handled the credit were Citicorp, Bank of America, West
Deutsche Landesbank, Bank of Tokyo and Manufacturers Hanover Trust. (Information ob-
tained by the author from the Ministry of the Treasury of Mexico).
14 Memorandum of Intentions, supra note 11, at 3. See generally CONGRESSIONAL RE-
SEARCH SERVICE, 95TH CONG., 2D SEss., MEXIco's OIL AND GAS POLICY: AN ANALYSIS PRE-
PARED FOR THE SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMM. (Joint
Comm. Print 1979); SuBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT & SUBCOMM. ON SCIENCE,
RESEARCH, AND TECHNOLOGY, 96TH CONG., lST Sass., REPORT ON U.S.IMExICo RELATIONS AND
POTENTIALS REGARDING ENERGY, IMMIGRATION, SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION AND TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER 2-21, 25-28 (Comm. Print 1979).
17 Weintraub, supra note 1, at 15, col. 2.
28 Id. at 15, coL 1.
19 Id. at 15, col. 2.
20 Joint Communique of Feb. 16, 1979, 79 DEPT STATE BULL. 60, 62 (Mar. 1979).
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The second of these visits, in September 1979, was another success.
III.
According to Professor Weintraub, "The last minute Mexican refusal
to permit the Shah of Iran to return from the U.S. made it clear that, in a
pinch, Mexico could not be counted on."'2 1 This statement has no basis in
fact. Mexico had never committed itself to the Shah's political asylum.
He was granted only a tourist visa: one which expired December 9, 1979.22
Moreover, the United States never officially sought Mexican assurance
that the Shah, once he left Mexico, would be able to return. The Shah's
arrival in Mexico, after the United States initially denied him entry was
not a result of U.S. Government intervention on his behalf. Finally, when
the Shah became ill, according to reliable experts, he traveled unnecessa-
rily to New York.2 3 It was the United States' decision to permit him to
enter this country that triggered the chain of events leading to the
deplorable situation in which we later found ourselves.
Therefore, it can be strongly argued that Mexico had no interna-
tional commitment. But even if such a commitment had in fact existed,
Mexico would have had a right to cancel it by virtue of the problems that
arose, which, in the words of the Secretary General of the United Na-
tions, were a threat to international peace and security.24
The U.S. Government went so far as to declare that Mexico had as-
sured the deposed Shah in writing that after his medical treatment in
New York he could return to any part of the Mexican Republic. The so-
called "commitment" between Mexico and the United States stemmed
from a "secret cable" to which journalist Jack Nelson gained access. In
the midst of the crisis caused by Mexico's refusal to welcome the Shah
back to the country, on December 20, 1979, Nelson published parts of the
"secret cable" in the Los Angeles Times, and the Washington Post repro-
duced this article the following day.2 5
Based on "official information," the author asserts that "President
21 Weintraub, supra note 1, at 15, col. 2.
22 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, Press Release, Nov. 29, 1979, at 1 [hereinafter
cited as Mexican Foreign Relations Ministry Press Release] [copy on file at Case Western
Reserve Journal of International Law].
23 Cohn & Lescaze, Many Doctors Think Shah Could Have Stayed in Mexico, Wash.
Post, Dec. 6, 1979, § A, at 8, col. 1; Shearer, Parade Special Intelligence Report, PARA.,
Jan. 6, 1980, at 4; Scott, Personality Parade, PARADE, Feb. 10, 1980, at 12.
24 Gwertzman, Waldheim Asks U.N. Council to Deal With Iranian Crisis: U.S.
'Strongly Supports' Move, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1979, § A, at 1, cols. 1, 13; Goldstein, Peril
to Peace Seen, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1979, § A, at 1, cols. 2, 3, 14.
25 The "secret State Department cable was sent to the White House at the time .... "
See Nelson, Mexican Leader Assured Shah He Could Return, L.A. Times, Dec. 20, 1979, §
A, at 6, col. 5.
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L6pez Portillo told the deposed Shah 'in writing' that he would be wel-
comed back to Mexico and granted political asylum." Word' for word, ac-
cording to the two newspaper reports, the Mexican President said: "This
is your country. You are always welcome. We are distressed and disturbed
by your health. A king should have premier medical treatment. 26
Allow me to analyze in general terms the text of the alleged "secret
cable." Anyone with a knowledge of Mexican idiosyncracies would imme-
diately discern the false ring of the assertions. Mexican citizens, including
the President of Mexico, believers in republican ideals, would never dis-
tinguish between a king and a commoner, least of all to declare a "king"
deserves "premier medical treatment" because of his rank. President L6-
pez Portillo would never have made such a statement.
The "secret cable" continues, according to the newspaper article, in a
similarly ludicrous way: "You should go to the United States for medical
treatment, and we await your return."27 In the first place, experts in the
field agree that this was unnecessary.2 8 Secondly, it would have been a
politically disastrous remark. All Mexican doctors, nurses, laboratory
technicians, professors and students, as well as the general public, would
have reacted immediately, enraged at President L6pez Portillo, who,
again, would never have made such a statement.29
Furthermore, the Nelson article says that when the Shah "was decid-
ing whether or not to come to the United States... U.S. officials knew
of the message," and according to one of them, "that was a factor in our
decision to have him come here for treatment." 0
The fact is that these "officials" would very much like to have Presi-
dent L6pez Portillo share the responsibility for the tragic decision to al-
low the Shah to go to New York for medical treatment. The trip was the
crucial starting point of the dramatic situation we have all undergone.
On December 25, 1979, journalists Walter Pincus and Dan Morgan
published the results of their investigations concerning the alleged "com-
mitment" of Mexico to the United States with regards to the Shah's re-
turn trip to Mexico.-" Their Washington Post article made evident that
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 See Mexican Foreign Relations Ministry Press Release, supra note 22.
21Marquis Childs, in his weekly column "Washington Calling," emphasized that "The
letter was false, as should have been evident from the language." Childs, Immediate Repairs
Needed In U.S.-Mexican Friendship, "Washington Calling", Jan.7, 1980 (syndicated by
United Features Syndicate, Inc.). See also Rowan, Hard Feelings Across the Border, Wash.
Star, Jan. 4, 1980, § A, at 9, col. 1; Hanson's Latin American Letter, Jan. 12, 1980, at 2.
3o Nelson, supra note 25. Supposedly, the written message from President L6pez Por-
tillo "was handed to the Shah by an (unnamed) intermediary on October 20, 1979." Id.
3' Pincus & Morgan, Mexico Denies Promising The Shah He Could Return, Wash.
Post, Dec. 25, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 2.
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the alleged letter written by President L6pez Portillo did not in fact ex-
ist. The "assurances" to which the State Department referred in the "se-
cret cable" originated in the Rockefeller office in New York which had
provided information suggesting that the Shah would return.3 2 The Pin-
cus and Morgan article clearly demonstrates that the United States got
its assurances "second hand."
I publicly challenged those who claimed the existence of a letter writ-
ten by President L6pez Portillo to the deposed Shah assuring him that he
could return to Mexico to produce such a letter.
It thus seems that there was no commitment between the Govern-
ments of Mexico and the United States to receive the former Shah again
in my country.
On November 28th, my Government received information that the
Shah intended to travel to Mexico within the next four days. Obviously,
the circumstances which prevailed on that date were radically different
from those existing five weeks earlier when the Shah left for New York.
For this reason, after taking into account all the risks, dangers and
problems involved for Mexico, it was decided to notify the Shah that his
visa would not be renewed once it expired on December 9th.
As was explained at the time that the official communiqu6 was is-
sued, the decision not to renew the Shah's visa was based on the protec-
tion of Mexico's vital interests, especially the peace and security of its
inhabitants."3 In addition, due regard was given to the fact that the situa-
tion prevailing in Iran at that time gave no reason to expect that the
Shah's departure for Mexico would facilitate a solution to the hostage
problem.
Allegedly, there would have been two consequences of the Shah's de-
parture from the United States to Mexico. First, the American hostages
in Iran would have had a very good chance of being released. Unfortu-
nately, this did not happen. The former Shah's trip to Panama was of no
help in this respect. Second, the return of the Shah to Mexico supposedly
would not have been in any way harmful to Mexico. The riots and ten-
sions in Panama proved differently.
In light of the foregoing events, the speech by Lloyd Bentsen, Sena-
tor from Texas, on December 17, 1979, was most unfortunate.34 He de-
clared that Mexico "has turned its back and resorted to political sniping"
S2 " . . .the disclosure to the Los Angeles Times of the text of the Oct. 21 State De-
partment cable makes clear that the 'Rbckefeller Office' rather than the Mexican Govern-
ment was the source of information regarding the assurances to the Shah... ." Id.
" Mexican Foreign Relations Ministry Press Release, supra note 22, at 1-2.
34 125 CONG. REc. S18,772 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1979) (remarks of Senator Bentsen) [here-
inafter cited as Bentsen Speech].
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by not welcoming back the former Shah. 5 He presumed the existence of a
commitment to the U.S. Government, and he even went so far as to say:
With regard to the recent Mexican decision to deny refuge to the Shah of
Iran, the United States had prior assurances from Mexico that the Shah
would be permitted to return to that country following medical treat-
ment here. Yet, when the Shah's scheduled departure from this country
became imminent, Mexico changed its mind, reneged on its commitment
and created a new elemefit of crisis in an already difficult situation.
3
1
To use the term "reneged" and to allege that Mexico did not honor
its commitments obliged Bentsen, within juridical and moral norms, to
substantiate his declarations. Since his allegations, neither Bentsen nor
anyone else has been able to prove that Mexico ever made a commitment
with the U.S. Government to assure the return of the former monarch to
Mexico.
Assuming, arguendo, that a conversation did take place between
President L6pez Portillo and the Shah and even supposing that a letter
existed, this would only show the existence of a would-be relationship
with a private citizen. The deposed Shah was not a U.S. citizen. This
could never be construed as a "commitment" between the Governments
of Mexico and the United States. It is well known that only the ministries
of foreign affairs of both countries can formally make such commitments.
In this case, no such commitment was made.
Moreover, Senator Bentsen argued that Mexico "even withdrew its
diplomatic representation in Teheran to eliminate the possibility of repri-
sal" that could be caused by the return of the Shah to Mexico. 7 In real-
ity, on November 12, 1979, as a sign of protest, Mexico withdrew its per-
sonnel from its Embassy in Iran. This was a preliminary step to the
severing of diplomatic relations due to the lack of guarantees in that
country.
During this crisis, Mexico, from the beginning condemned the abuses
of the Ayatollah Khoemeini. At the Organization of American States, the
Mexican Representative, Ambassador Rafael de la Colina, assisted in the
drafting of the resolution condemning the Iranian government.3 8
When Mexico, in the light of the international tensions, denied the
Shah an extension of his tourist visa, it condemned the uncivilized atti-




8 OAS Permanent Council, Declaration of the Permanent Council of the Organization
of American States on the Occupation of the Embassy of the United States of America in
Iran and the Holding of its Personnel as Hostages, OEA/Ser. G, CP/RES, 296 (409/79)
(Nov. 26, 1979).
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The Government of Mexico has strongly condemned this act which rep-
resents a flagrant violation of one of the most ancient and respected in-
ternational principles: the inviolability of embassies and their diplomatic
representatives, a principle which has been respected even during war
time.3 9
Senator Bentsen did not stop his diatribe with the topic of the Shah,
as he continued in the same aggressive language to attack President L6-
pez Portillo for his statement concerning the freezing of Iranian assets in
U.S. banks. The President of Mexico said that he considered it inappro-
priate to freeze Iranian assets in U.S. banks. Bentsen took Mexico to task
for the claim that the United States' decision was "aggressive" and "pre-
cipitous." The freeze, Senator Bentsen said, "was clearly an exceptional
response to an unprecedented provocation.' 0 Nevertheless, newspapers
from the United States and other countries, using their unrestricted free-
dom of expression, have presented arguments similar to those of Presi-
dent L6pez Portillo.' 1 Friendship does not presuppose a concordance of
ideas. In the United States one has the right to dissent. Mexico has the
same right. We shall never accept friendship conditioned on acquiescence.
In accordance with these principles of freedom of expression of ideas,
the Government of Mexico allowed, but did not organize, the convening
of an international conference on the independence of Puerto Rico. Sena-
tor Bentsen, however, "failed to understand why an international confer-
ence on the independence of Puerto Rico-a conference attended mainly
by delegates from Communist nations and engineered to generate anti-
U.S. propaganda- was held in Mexico from November 20 to December
2." 2 To that I can only reply that to be afraid of freedom of expression is
a sign of weakness.
IV.
When we talk about U.S.-Mexican relations we all agree that there
are difficult problems to be solved: we likewise agree that they are not
insurmountable. The real problem that undoubtedly causes great damage
to our bilateral relations arises when facts are misunderstood, as in the
case of the "blow out" of the Ixtoc I oil well.
For example, Professor Weintraub asserts that "the suggestion that
Mexico had some responsibility for the damage to the Texas coast from
the spill from Mexico's oil drilling in the Gulf of Mexico was summarily
39 Mexican Foreign Relations Ministry Press Release, supra note 22, at 1.
40 Bentsen Speech, supra note 34, at S18,772.
41 See Review and Outlook: The Chill From Frozen Assets, Wall. St. J., Dec. 4, 1979, at
26, col. 1.
42 Bentsen Speech, supra note 34, at S18,773.
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dismissed with anti-American rhetoric recalling Colorado River salin-
ity."' 3 First of all, there was no bilateral agreement on which to base a
claim for Mexican responsibility. Consequently, there was a need to de-
vise a legal instrument, bilateral in character, establishing a procedure for
compensation of damages caused to either one of our countries by the
other.
In this context, a joint commission of representatives from Mexico
and the United States was formed to negotiate an agreement and to pre-
sent it to the two respective governments. The Agreement on Cooperation
Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States
Regarding Pollution of the Marine Environment by Discharges of Hydro-
carbons and Other Hazardous Substances was signed on July 24, 1980,
and it will be applied in the case of future damages. 44 Until this agree-
ment was concluded, there had been no legal bilateral instrument to bind
either country.
The Colorado river salinity case mentioned by Professor Weintraub
was not simply anti-American rhetoric. This case involved the drainage of
lands into the U.S. portion of the Colorado river in the area known as the
Wellton-Mohawk. This action affected the lands of the Mexicali Valley
downstream on the Colorado, where a considerable number of Mexican
farmers earned their living. The washing of the Wellton-Mohawk lands in
order to improve them, without taking into account the resulting contam-
ination of the south-flowing waters, was a voluntary act. The high degree
of salinity in the Colorado river water was reduced only after long diplo-
matic negotiations were carried out in accordance with the treaties in
force at the time.45 Mexico was not compensated for the damage caused
to the lands of the Mexicali Valley. Stating these facts should not be con-
sidered "anti-American."
One must underscore the very different nature of the two cases: while
the salinity of the Colorado River was due to a voluntary act, the oil spill
at the Ixtoc I was an accidental blow-out, which took place just as Mexico
was trying its best to develop its energy potential, a potential which has
enabled it to export, at a time of an international oil shortage, a consider-
able number of barrels of this valuable resource, thus helping to ease the
tensions created by this scarcity.
Now that we have a bilateral agreement, which will not be retroac-
tively applicable, Mexico will honor its international commitments, as is
43 Weintraub, supra note 1, at 15, col 2.
4 Agreement on Cooperation Regarding Pollution of the Marine Environment by Dis-
charges of Hydrocarbons and Other Hazardous Substances, July 24, 1980, Mexico-United
States, 80 DEP'T. STATE BuLL. 85 (Oct. 1980).
45 Treaty Relating to the Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and
of the Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944, Mexico-United States, 59 Stat. 1223, T.S. No. 944.
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its tradition.
V.
Much too much has been said and will be said about the undocu-
mented workers that illegally enter the United States from Mexico. Pro-
fessor Weintraub states that "Mexicans are properly concerned about the
treatment of Mexican workers who come here without documents."'
Without question, Mexicans are worried about the treatment received by
the Mexican workers in the United States. Our main concern is the pro-
tection of their rights, in times when respect for human rights has been
given such emphasis. Unfortunately, our workers are humiliated and ex-
ploited by organizations without any respect for the ethical norms which
forbid exploitation of man by fellow man. More often than not it is for-
gotten that this is human tragedy of major proportions, a tragedy in
which human traffic is now more profitable than drug traffic. 47
VI.
Weintraub writes, "We are trying to bury the past, whereas-to para-
phrase Mexican historian Octavio Paz-Mexico is living with its past. 48
It has been said before that Mexico and the United States are two
peoples with diverse cultural origins. It is true that Mexicans place a
great deal of emphasis on their splendid historical past-the Anthropo-
logical Museum in Mexico City gives witness to this fact. It is a jewel of
contemporary world architecture. We consider the colonial era to be an
extraordinary example of the intermixing of cultures. The dynamic Mex-
ico of today, with its advanced industrial developments in certain sectors
and a cultural movement which has attracted the attention of the world,
is a product of the Revolution started in 1910.
Mexico recalls with pride its past history and projects its own very
"mestizo" personality, the fruit of two great cultures. Day to day, in the
cultural and economic spheres, one sees progress, coupled with originality,
by which Mexico makes an important contribution to world culture.
Rather than a country entrenched in its past, it is a dynamic country,
with an extraordinary future.
When Josephus Daniels was appointed Ambassador from the United
States to Mexico in 1933, he told us with commendable frankness that he
had forgotten the U.S. invasion of Veracruz, which he himself, as Secre-
'" Weintraub, supra note 1, at 15, col. 2.
'1 Crewsdon, Aliens, Not Drugs, Are the Contraband of Choice Along the Mexican
Border, N.Y. Times, July 21, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
48 Weintraub, supra note 1, at 15, col. 2.
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tary of the Navy, had ordered.49 In this operation, many Mexicans died
defending their country and Daniels' wife had to remind him of this fact.
When he went to see President Roosevelt, who in 1914 was Undersecre-
tary of the Navy and therefore a colleague of Daniels, the President had
also forgotten the American occupation of Veracruz.50
To "bury the past" to such an extent will not help to solve our differ-
ences at all. It is true that we cannot remain entrenched in the past, but
we must know it and appreciate it and give it its just value in order to
improve on the lessons of history in our bilateral relationship.
Let us not forget that Mexico is a true friend of the United States,
but it is also a country zealously independent and sovereign. We wish to
continue the prevailing good relations, vital for both countries. Proximity
is a form of interdependence which must be based on mutual respect. We
sincerely hope that strong feelings do not obfuscate clear thinking and
that discrepancies of criteria are overcome so that the friendly feelings
between our countries can prevail.
In closing, let me quote President L6pez Portillo's toast during Presi-
dent Carter's visit to Mexico:
[W]e must view the complex phenomenon of our interrelationship, which
should never be confused with dependence, integration, or the blurring of
borders. The two countries complement and need each other, but neither
would want to depend on the other to the point of nullifying its own
sovereign will, reducing the scope of its international activities, or losing
its self-respect.51
I have examined an article by an American scholar, the "secret cable"
from the State Department which was leaked to the press, and Senator
Bentsen's speech. In so doing, the attitude of different and important sec-
tors of United States' society towards bilateral relations with Mexico have
been outlined. From my comments, it can be noted that there is much
room to learn, in order to know each other better and thus avoid unneces-
sary friction. We are neighbors and for everyone's well-being we all aspire
to a policy of respect in friendship.
49 J. DANMELS, SHmT-SLEEvE DIPLOMAT 3 (1947).
50 Id. at 4.
" President L6pez Portillo's Toast to President Carter, 15 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES.
Doc. 274 (Feb. 14, 1979).
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